For many years, sociologists had used
scientific methods to study institutions and the structure of society as a
whole. However, the middle of the 20th century saw a shift in emphasis toward
understanding the social actions of individuals—a study of reasons and meanings
rather than quantities and correlations. This came to be known to sociologists as
the interpretative approach.
From
the 1950s, the scope of this interpretive method widened slightly to include
the study of
families,
which could perhaps be seen as a social unit somewhere between the individual
and institutions. As such, it was possible to identify not only the relationships
between individuals and their families, but also the connections between
families and wider society. This area of study progressed to examine interpersonal
relationships and how they are shaped by society.
Family roles
Among
the first sociologists to examine the family in this way was US scholar Talcott
Parsons, who combined the interpretive approach of German social theorist Max
Weber with the concept of functionalism. For Parsons, the family is one of the
“building blocks” of society, and has a specific function in the working of
society as a whole. Its primary function, he argued, was to provide an
environment in which children can be prepared for roles they will later play in
society, by instilling in them its rules and social norms. Adults too benefit
from another function of the family unit—to offer a framework in which they can
develop stable relationships.
Others
were more critical of the conventional notions of family. Traditionally,
families reflected the norms of wider society—patriarchal in their structure,
with a male breadwinner and a female childcarer and houseworker. But attitudes
changed rapidly after World War II. The idea of the stayat- home mother was
increasingly regarded as a form of oppression, and feminist sociologists such
as Ann Oakley and Christine Delphy described the alienation that these women
experienced.
Gender
roles within the family and, by extension, within society as a whole, began to
be challenged, as did the idea that there is such a thing as a “typical” or
“norma family. As
a result of the decline of the traditional patriarchal family model, the conflicting
pressures of home and work now affect both partners in many couples, putting a
strain on their relationship. The nature of families, according to Judith
Stacey, is continually changing to meet the demands of the modern world and
also responding to and shaping social norms, so that, for example, singleparent
families and same-sex couples are no longer considered unusual in Western
societies.
Interpersonal relationships
The
more liberal attitude toward sexual relationships and sexuality in the West
was, however, slow in coming. In the 1930s and 1940s, the anthropologist
Margaret Mead helped to pave the way with her study of gender roles and
sexuality in various cultures around the world, showing that ideas of sexual
behavior are more a social construction than a biological fact. In the West,
despite increasing secularization, religious morality continued to influence
the social norms of heterosexual relationships within marriage.
Attitudes
toward relationships changed greatly during the 1960s. An anti-establishment
youth culture
helped break taboos surrounding sex, advocating hedonistic free love and a
relaxed view of homosexuality. This change in culture was echoed by the academic
work of French scholar Michel Foucault and others.
Foucault
believed that the new openness toward intimate relationships of all kinds was a
way of challenging the sexual norms imposed by society, and his ideas paved the
way for the sociological study of sexuality itself.
In
the 1980s, Jeffrey Weeks applied the idea of sexual norms as a social construct
to his study
of
sexuality, and specifically homosexuality, while Christine Delphy described the
experiences of lesbians in a predominantly heterosexual society. Perhaps the most
influential sociologist in this field of study, however, is Judith Butler, who
advocated challenging not only notions of sexuality, but the entire concept of
gender and gender identity too, opening up a
new, and radical, field of study now known as queer theory, which calls into
question conventional ideas of what constitutes normal sexual behavior.
Diferences
Between The Sexes Are Cultural Creations
Margaret Mead
(1901-1978)
In early 20th-century US society, a
man’s role was to provide for his family, while women were relegated to the private
sphere and considered responsible for childcare and housework because they were
thought to be naturally more inclined to such roles. Margaret Mead, however,
believed that gender is not based on biological differences between the sexes, but
rather reflects the cultural conditioning of different societies.
Mead’s
investigations of the intimate lives of non-Western peoples in the 1930s and
1940s crystallized her criticisms of her own society: she claimed that the ways
in which US society expressed gender and sexuality restricted possibilities for
both men and women. Mead claims that men and women are punished and rewarded to
encourage gender conformity, and what is viewed as masculine is also seen as
superior.
Mead
takes a comparative approach to gender in her studies of three tribes in New
Guinea. Her findings challenge conventional Western ideas about how human behavior
is determined. Arapesh men and women were “gentle, responsive, and cooperative”
and both undertook childcare—traits the West would see as “feminine.”
Similarly,
it was the norm for Mundugumor women to behave in a “masculine” way by being as
violent and aggressive as the men. And in a further reversal of traditional
Western roles, women in Tchambuli society were dominant, while men were seen as
dependent.
The
fact that behaviors coded as masculine in one society may be regarded as
feminine in another, leads Mead to argue that temperamental attitudes can no longer
be regarded as sex-linked.
Her
theory that gender roles are not natural but are created by society established
gender as a critical concept; it allows us to see the historical and
cross-cultural ways in which masculinity, femininity, and sexuality are ideologically
constructed.
Change can happen
Mead’s
work laid the foundations for the women’s liberation movement and informed the so-called
“sexual revolution” of the 1960s onward. Her ideas posed a fundamental
challenge to society’s rigid understandings of gender roles and sexuality.
Following
on from Mead, feminists such as US cultural anthropologist Gayle Rubin argued
that if gender, unlike sex, is a social construction, there is no reason why
women should continue to be treated unequally. Viewing gender as culturally determined
allows us to see, and therefore challenge, the ways in which social structures
such as the law, marriage, and the media encourage stereotyped ways of conducting
our intimate lives.
In
comparison to the early 20th century, gender roles for both men and women in
the 21st century have become far less restrictive, with women participating
more in the public sphere.
Gender roles are cultural creations according
to Mead. There is no evidence that women are naturally better than men at doing
the housework or caring for children
Sociology initially
focused its attention on the changes to society that had been brought about by industrialization. A major aspect of modernity was the changing nature of
people’s working lives: the dramatic shift from agriculture and crafts in rural
communities to employment in the new manufacturing industries. Along with this
came the growth of capitalism, bringing prosperity to at least some members of
society
Among
the first to study the implications of work in modern industrial society were
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who saw the emergence of two social classes: an
affluent bourgeoisie, or middle class, and an oppressed proletariat, or working
class. But as well as the exploitation of the working class, the pair
recognized that the repetitive and soulless nature of the work itself alienated
the workers, while the division of labor removed any feeling of connection with
the finished product or pride in their work. Later, Max Weber pointed out how
rationalization and the work ethic combined to force people to work for a
specific economic end rather than for the good of the community as a whole.
Traditional communal values had been eroded, and replaced with an emphasis on material
worth.
Consumer society
For
the working class, thistranslated into
a struggle to earn the means to support a family, and resignation to a life of
work that was unrewarding in every sense. For the growing capitalist middle class,
it meant increased prosperity and leisure. The value that was ascribed to
material wealth meant that a person’s social status was judged by economic
worth.
Toward
the end of the 19th century, sociologist Thorstein Veblen pointed out that the bourgeoisie
could assert its social status, whether real or not, by conspicuous consumption—
spending
not on goods and services that were necessary, but luxuries and leisure
pursuits that would be noticed. Colin Campbell was later to liken the rise of a
“consumer society” in the 20th century to the Romanticism that flourished in reaction
to 18th-century rationalism and industrialization. Daniel Miller saw the growth
of material consumerism as a potential source of social cohesion—a means of identifying
with a social group.
Industrialization
continued to spread across the world in the 20th century, and technological advances
led to an increase in automation—in agricultural and traditional crafts as well
as in manufacturing industries. Societies, in the industrialized West at least,
became more materially prosperous, and fostered the rapid growth of mass consumerism,
but sociologists disagreed
about the effects of automation on the workforce.
Robert
Blauner forecast that automation would free people from mindless tasks and
reduce their feelings of alienation. On the other hand, Harry Braverman argued that
automation meant workers were no longer required to develop professional
skills, had less control over their working lives, and felt yet more alienated.
Somewhere between these two views, however, Michael Burawoy suggested that workers
reconcile themselves to ultimately dull and oppressive work by recognizing its
positive aspects.
Post-industrial work
In
the 1970s, around 200 years after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution,
the nature of work looked set to change yet again. Daniel Bell predicted that mechanization
would take people out of manufacturing industries, and they would be employed predominantly
in the information and service industries. To a large extent, in the affluent
world at least, this has proved correct. Another change that became apparent in
the latter part of the 20th century is that work was no longer seen as a male
preserve; more women than ever before are in paid employment.
One effect of the shift
into what is now known as the post-industrial world has been identified by
Arlie Hochschild. Service industries are more emotionally demanding than
manufacturing; in effect, they commercialize emotion, to the extent, she
argues, that people can associate their feelings with their work rather than
their home lives and leisure. The social effects of these recent changes to the
nature of employment have yet to be fully studied; it is too early to tell
whether work in the service economy will prove to be any more rewarding, or conducive
to social solidarity, than manufacturing work—or if gender inequality will be
reduced because more women are in the workforce.
Conspicuous
Consumption Of To The Gentleman Of Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) Valuable Goods
Leisure Is A Means Of Reputability.
The work of US economist and sociologist
Thorstein Veblen focuses on the relationship between economy and society, and
on how different class groups consume specific goods and services.
He draws on the ideas of a number of key theorists, including Karl Marx,
British sociologist Herbert Spencer, and British naturalist Charles Darwin.
Veblen’s insights into capitalist society and the types of consumer behavior it
gives rise to are outlined in his most celebrated work, The Theoryof
the Leisure Class: An EconomicStudy of Institutions (1899).
Capitalism and class
Veblen
sees the transition from traditional to modern society as propelled by the
development of technical knowledge and industrial production methods. Like
Marx, Veblen argues that capitalist society is split into two competing social-class
groups: the industrious class made up of workers; and the leisure class, also
referred to as the pecuniary or business class (which also includes
politicians, managers, lawyers, and so on), which owns the factories and
workshops
The
industrious class forms the vast majority of the population and engages in
productive labor, such as manual craft and machine work. By contrast, the
leisure class is a numerically far smaller, but nevertheless socially and economically
privileged, group that is parasitic on the labor of the industrious class. For
Veblen, members of this predatory leisure class do not produce anything of any
real benefit to the wider good of society. The wealth and privilege they
possess derive from driving competition and manipulating workers, with the sole
aim of increasing
their personal wealth. Worse still, the privileged class consistently impedes
positive social advancement through its deliberate mismanagement of industry
and society generally.
Social recognition
Veblen’s
concept of “conspicuous consumption” is his most renowned contribution to
economic and sociological theory. Framed by the Darwinian notion that all life represents
an ongoing struggle for resources in the pursuit of advancement of the species
(or in the case of human societies, the groups to which individuals belong),
Veblen argues that under capitalism the majority of human behavior is
determined by struggles for social recognition, status, and power. This is most
evident in relation to patterns of consumption and leisure.
Conspicuous consumption refers
to spending money on, and consumption of, nonessential luxury goods in order to
display to other members of society one’s own economic and material wealth. An
example of this is the modern business tycoon who buys an expensive yacht so
that he can entertain friends and clients. It is not the utility value of the
yacht (whether or not it is an effective means of transport) that matters to
the tycoon; rather, its value is as a highly conspicuous signifier of the wealth
at the tycoon’s disposal, for which he will receive both admiration and respect.
Leisure and waste
Closely
bound to Veblen’s concept of conspicuous consumption is the notion of
conspicuous leisure : the vast amount of time that members of the leisure class spend in pursuit of activities that are neither
economically nor socially productive. Very simply, leisure implies an absence
of work. For members of this privileged class who have sufficient distance from
economic necessity (the need to work), the nonproductive use of time can be
used to further their social prestige and class position. Going on exotic
foreign vacations and learning about other countries are classic examples of
conspicuous leisure, according to Veblen.
The
inevitable consequence of conspicuous leisure and consumption is the production
of unnecessary waste. Conspicuous waste, argues Veblen, derives from the
amalgamation of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure. The net result
of these two activities is that socially valuable resources (the raw materials
and human labor essential for the production of consumer goods and services)
and time are wasted. A glaring example of this culture of waste is the
depletion of natural resources such as oil and minerals in the manufacture of
luxury. goods and commodities, which in turn gives rise to increased carbon emissions
and climate change.
Veblen’s
concepts of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure are “political” ones
because they contain within them a strong moral stance toward the actions and
lifestyle of what he sees as the predatory and parasitic leisure class.
The concept of “Veblen goods,”
or luxury goods that signal high status, appeared in economic theory in the
1970s. In a reversal of usual trends, the higher the price of these items, the
more they are desired.
The carbon-copy lifestyle of
some middle-class neighborhoods arises from pressure to emulate the consumption
practices of residents in an attempt to gain status and prestige.
From its beginnings in the early 19th
century, sociology sought to examine not only the institutions and systems that
created social order, but also the factors that maintained social cohesion.
Traditionally,
this had come from the shared values, beliefs, and experiences of communities,
but with the advent of “modernity” in the form of industrialization and secularization,
the structure of society was radically transformed. Although it was recognized
that modernity had changed the way people associated with one another, it was
not until the 20th century that culture—the ways that people think and behave
as a group, and how they identify themselves as members of a society—became an
object of study in its own right.
The
emergence of sociology—the systematic study of how society shapes human
interaction and identity—had coincided with the establishment of anthropology and
psychology, and there was a degree of overlap between the three disciplines. It
is unsurprising, then, that one of the first cultural sociologists was also a
pioneering social psychologist, G.H. Mead. He set the scene for a sociological study
of culture by highlighting the connection between the individual and society,
and especially the notion of a social identity. An individual, he argued, can
only develop a true sense of identity in the context of a social group, through
interaction with others.
The
connections with social psychology continued throughout the 20th century,
notably in the work of Erich Fromm in the 1950s, who argued that many psychological
problems have social origins. In the process of connecting with wider society and
identifying with a particular culture, individuals are expected to conform with
society, and this stifles our individualism so that we lose a true sense of
self. Around the same time, Erving Goffman began discussing the problems of
establishing a sense of identity, and in the 1960s, he focused on the stigma
attached to those who do not conform or are “different.”
Culture and social order
Norbert
Elias, in the 1930s, had described the imposition of social norms and
conventions as a “civilizing process,” directly regulating individual behavior.
There is clearly a connection between the regulating power of culture and the
maintenance of social order, and some saw it
as
more than merely a process of socialization. Antonio Gramsci recognized the
potential for culture to be used as a means of social control. Through subtle
coercion, a dominant culture imposes a “cultural hegemony” in which social
norms become so ingrained that anything else is unthinkable.
Michel
Foucault developed this idea further in his study of power relations, and
others, including Herbert Marcuse, examined the ways in which culture could be used
to quell social unrest. Later, another French sociologist, Jean Baudrillard,
argued that in the postmodern world, with its explosion of availability of information,
culture had become so far removed from the society in which it exists that it
bears little relation to reality.
Cultural identity
A
distinct branch of culturally oriented sociology emerged in the UK from the
latter part of the 20th century: cultural studies. The starting point was
Raymond Williams’ extensive research into the idea of culture. His work transformed
the concept, opening up entirely new areas of study to sociological
investigation.
Williams
explained that culture is expressed by material production and consumption, and
by the creations and leisure pursuits of social groups of a specific time and
place—their food, sports, fashion, languages, beliefs, ideas, and customs, as
well as their literature, art, and music. Also at the forefront of this British
school of cultural studies was Stuart Hall, who suggested that notions of
cultural identity are no longer fixed. With significantly improved
communications and increased mobility, traditional national, ethnic, class, and
even gender identities have all but disappeared—and another British sociologist,
Benedict Anderson, goes so far as to suggest that the concept of belonging to
any community is illusory.
However,
the US sociologist Jeffrey Alexander considered culture to be an independent variable
in the structure of society. His cultural sociology examines how culture shapes
society through the creation of shared meaning.
THE “I” AND THE “ME”
George Herbert Mead was a social psychologist and a philosopher, and he looked to both disciplines in trying to work out what exactly we mean when we talk about the “self.” Traditional philosophers and sociologists saw societies as growing from the coming together of individual, autonomous selves, but Mead said the opposite was true—selves emerge from social interactions; they are formed within society.
This concept is prevalent now in psychology and psychotherapy, but when Mead first presented his ideas in 1913 in The Social Self, it was a revolutionary point of view. Mead disagreed with the idea that individual, experiencing selves exist in any recognizable way before they are part of the social process. The social process of experience or behavior is “logically prior to the individuals and their individual experiencing which are involved in it.”
By this, Mead is suggesting that an individual’s consciousness, with all its intentions, desires, and so on, is formed within the context of social relationships, one or more particular languages, and a set of cultural norms. From birth, babies begin to sense communication through gestures, which function as symbols and build “a universe of discourse.” Over time, they learn to mimic and “import” the practices, gestures, and eventually words of those around them, so that they can make their own response and receive further gestures and words from others.
In the late 19th century, societies
began to coalesce around urban centers, and Western Europe entered a phase
known as modernity, characterized by industrialization and capitalism.
According to Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, societies have moved away from
that first phase of modernity—which he termed “solid modernity”—and now occupy
a period in human history called “liquid modernity.” This new period is,
according to Bauman, one marked by unrelenting uncertainty and change that
affects society at the global, systemic level, and also at the level of
individual experience. Bauman’s use of the term “liquid” is a powerful metaphor
for present-day life: it is mobile, fast-flowing, changeable, amorphous,
without a center of gravity, and difficult to contain and predict. In essence,
liquid modernity is a way of life that exists in the continuous, unceasing
reshaping of the modern world in ways that are unpredictable, uncertain, and
plagued by increasing levels of risk. Liquid modernity, for Bauman, is the
current stage in the broader evolution of Western—and now also global—society.
Like Karl Marx, Bauman believes that human society progresses in a way that means
each “new” stage develops out of the stage before it. Thus it is necessary to
define solid modernity before it is possible to understand liquid modernity.
Defining solid modernity
Bauman
sees solid modernity as ordered, rational, predictable, and relatively stable.
Its defining feature is the organization of human activity and institutions
along bureaucratic lines, where practical reasoning can be employed to solve
problems and create technical solutions. Bureaucracy persists because it is the
most efficient way of organizing and ordering the actions and interactions of
large numbers of people. While bureaucracy has its distinctly negative aspects
(for example, that human life can become dehumanized and devoid of spontaneity
and creativity), it is highly effective at accomplishing goal-oriented tasks.
Another
key characteristic of solid modernity, according to Bauman, is a very high
degree of equilibrium in social structures—meaning that people live with a
relatively stable set of norms, traditions, and institutions. By this, Bauman
is not suggesting
Auschwitz concentration camp in
Poland was built and run by the Nazis.
Bauman cites the Holocaust as a
product of the highly rational, planned
nature of solid modernity. that social, political, and economic changes do not
occur in solid modernity, just that changes occur in ways that are relatively ordered
and predictable. The economy provides a good example: in solid modernity, the
majority of people — from members of the working class through to middle-class professionals—enjoyed
relatively high levels of job security. As a consequence, they tended to remain
in the same geographical area, grow up in the same neighborhood, and attend the
same school as their parents and other family members.
Bauman
regards solid modernity as one-directional and progressive — a realization of
the Enlightenment view that reason leads to the emancipation of humankind. As scientific
knowledge advances, so does society’s understanding of, and control over, the
natural and social worlds. In solid modernism, according to Bauman, this
supreme faith in scientific reasoning was embodied in the social and political
institutions that addressed primarily national issues and problems.
Enlightenment values were institutionally entrenched in the figurehead of the
State—the primary point of reference from which emerged the development of
social, political, and economic ideals.
At
the level of the individual, claims Bauman, solid modernity gave rise to a
stable repertoire of personal identities and possible versions of selfhood.
Solid modern individuals have a unified, rational, and stable sense of personal
identity, because it is informed by a number of stable categories, such as
occupation, religious affiliation, nationality, gender, ethnicity, leisure
pursuits, lifestyle, and so on. Social life under the conditions of solid
modernity—like the individuals it created—was selfassured rational,
bureaucratically organized, and relatively predictable and stable.
From solid to liquid
The
transition from solid to liquid modernity, according to Bauman, has occurred as
a result of a confluence of profound and connected economic, political, and
social changes. The result is
a global order propelled by what Bauman describes as a “compulsive, obsessive,
and addictive reinventing of the world.”
Bauman
identifies five distinct, but interrelated, developments that have brought
about the transition from solid to liquid modernity. First, nation-states are
no longer the “key load-bearing structures” of society; national governments today
have considerably less power to determine events both at home and abroad.
Second, global capitalism has risen and multiand transnational corporations have
proliferated, resulting in a decentering of state authority. Third, electronic
technologies and the Internet now allow for near-instant, supranational flows
of communication. Fourth, societies have become ever more preoccupied by
risk—dwelling on insecurities and potential hazards. And fifth, there has been
huge growth in human migration across the globe.
Defining liquid modernity
As
Bauman himself observes, attempting to define liquid modernity is something of
a paradox, because the term refers to a global condition that is characterized
by unrelenting change, flux, and uncertainty. However, having identified the traits
of solid modernity, he claims it is possible to define the most prominent
aspects of liquid modernity
At
an ideological level, liquid modernity undermines the Enlightenment ideal that
scientific knowledge can ameliorate natural and social problems. In liquid modernity,
science, experts, university-based academics, and government officials—once the
supreme figures of authority in solid modernity—occupy a highly ambiguous
status as guardians of the truth. Scientists are increasingly perceived as
being as much the cause of environmental and sociopolitical problems as they are
the solution. This inevitably leads to increased skepticism and general apathy
on the part of the general public
Liquid
modernity has undermined the certainties of individuals regarding employment, education,
and welfare. Today, many workers must either retrain or change occupation
altogether, sometimes several times—the notion of a “job for life,” which was
typical in the age of solid modernity, has been rendered unrealistic and
unachievable
The
practice of “re-engineering,” or the downsizing of firms—a term that Bauman
borrows from the US sociologist, Richard Sennett—has become increasingly
common, as it enables corporations to remain financially competitive in the global
market by reducing labor costs significantly. As part of this process, stable,
permanent work—which typified solid modernism—is being replaced by temporary
employment contracts that are issued to a largely mobile workforce. Closely
related to this occupational instability is the shifting role and nature of education.
Individuals are now required to continue their education—often at their own expense—throughout
their careers in order to remain up to date with developments in their
respective professions, or as a means of ensuring they remain “marketable” in
case of redundancy.
Concurrent
with these changes to employment patterns is the retreat of the welfare state.
What was once regarded historically as a reliable “safety net” guarding against
personal misfortune such as ill-health and unemployment, state provision of
welfare is rapidly being withdrawn, especially in the areas of social housing,
statefunded higher education, and national health care.
Fluid identities
Where
solid modernity was based on the industrial production of consumer goods in
factories and industrial plants, liquid modernity is instead based on the rapid
and relentless consumption of consumer goods and services.
This
transition from production to consumption, says Bauman, is a result of the
dissolution of the social structures, such as occupation and nationality, to
which identity was anchored in solid modernity. But in liquid modernity
selfhood is not so fixed: it is fragmented, unstable, often internally incoherent,
and frequently no more than the sum of consumer choices out of which it is
simultaneously constituted and represented. In liquid modernity, the boundary between
the authentic self and the representation of the self through consumer choice
breaks down : we are—according to Bauman— what we buy and no more. Depth and
surface meaning have fused together, and it is impossible to separate them out.
Consumption and identity
The
central importance of consumption in the construction of individual
self-identity goes beyond the acquisition of consumer goods. Without the
unchanging sources of identity provided by solid modernity, individuals in the
modern world seek guidance, stability, and personal direction from an
ever-broadening range of alternative sources, such as lifestyle coaches,
psychoanalysts, sex therapists, holistic life-experts, health gurus, and so on.
Self-identity has become problematic for the individual in ways that are
historically unprecedented, and the consequence is a cycle of endless self-questioning
and introspection that serves only to confound the individual even more.
Ultimately, the result is that our experience of ourselves and everyday life is
increasingly played out against a backdrop of ongoing anxiety, restlessness,
and unease about who we are, our place in the world, and the rapidity of the
changes taking place around us.
Liquid
modernity thus principally refers to a global society that is plagued by
uncertainty and instability. However, these destabilizing forces are not evenly
distributed across global society. Bauman identifies and explains the
importance of the variables of mobility, time, and space for understanding why.
For Bauman, the capacity to remain mobile is an extremely valuable attribute in
liquid modernity, because it facilitates the successful pursuit of wealth and
personal fulfillment
Tourists and vagabonds
Bauman
distinguishes between the winners and losers in liquid modernity. The people
who benefit most from the fluidity of liquid modernity are the socially privileged
individuals who are able to float freely around the world. These people, who
Bauman refers to as “tourists,” exist in time rather than space. By this he
means that through their easy access to Internet-based technologies and transnational
flights, tourists are able—virtually and in reality—to span the entire globe
and operate in locations where the economic conditions are the most favorable and
standards of living the highest. By stark contrast, the “vagabonds,” as Bauman
calls them, are people who are immobile, or subject to forced mobility, and
excluded from consumer culture. Life for them involves either being mired in places
where unemployment is
high
and the standard of living is very poor, or being forced to leave their country
of origin as economic or political refugees in search of employment, or in
response to the threat of war or persecution. Anywhere they stay for too long soon
becomes inhospitable.
For
Bauman, mass migration and transnational flows of people around the globe are
among the hallmarks of liquid modernity and are factors contributing to the unpredictable
and constantly changing nature of everyday life: Bauman’s social categories of tourists
and vagabonds occupy two extremes of this phenomenon
Applying Bauman’s theory
Zygmunt
Bauman is considered one of the most influential and eminent sociologists of
the modern age. He prefers not to align himself with any particular
intellectual tradition—his writings are relevant to a vast range of
disciplines, from ethics, media, and cultural studies to political theory and
philosophy. Within sociology, his work on liquid modernity is regarded by the
vast majority of thinkers as a unique contribution to the field.
The
Irish sociologist Donncha Marron has applied Bauman’s concept of liquid
modernity to a critical rethinking of consumer credit within the US. Following Bauman’s
suggestion that consumption of goods and brands is a key feature of how
individuals construct personal identity, Marron notes that the credit card is
an important tool in this process because it is ideally suited for enabling
people to adapt to the kind of fluid ways of living Bauman depicts. The credit card
can, for example, be used to fund shopping trips to satisfy consumer desire. It
makes paying for things easier, quicker, and considerably more manageable. The
credit card of course also serves the function, says Marron, of meeting
day-to-day bills and expenses, as people move between jobs or make significant
career moves. And the physical card itself can often be co-branded with things
the owner is interested in, such as football teams, charities, or stores. These
co-branded cards represent a small but revealing means whereby a person is able
to select and present a sense of who they are to the outside world
As prehistory’s primitive human groups
began to settle down in one place, the foundations of civilization were laid.
From these early beginnings, humans increasingly lived together in larger and
larger groups, and civilization grew further with the establishment of
villages, towns, and cities. But for the greater part of human history, most
people lived in rural communities. Large-scale urbanization came about only
with the Industrial Revolution, which was accompanied by a huge expansion of
towns and cities, and massive numbers of people migrating to work in the
factories and mills that were located
there
Living in an urban
environment became as much an aspect of“modernity” as industrialization and
the growth of capitalism, and sociologists from Adam Ferguson to Ferdinand
Tönnies recognized that there was a major difference between traditional rural communities
and modern urban ones. This alteration of social order was ascribed to a
variety of factors by an assortment of thinkers: to capitalism by Karl Marx; to
the division of labor in industry by Émile Durkheim; to rationalization and
secularization by Max Weber. It was Georg Simmel who suggested that urbanization
itself had affected the ways in which people interact socially—and one of the
fundamental characteristics of modern living is life in the city.
Community in the city
Simmel
examined not only the new forms of social order that had arisen in the modern
cities, but also the effects upon the individual of living in large groups,
often separated from traditional community ties and family. Building upon his
work, the so-called Chicago School of sociology, spearheaded by Robert E. Park,
helped to establish a distinct field of urban sociology. Soon, however,
sociologists changed the emphasis of their research from what it is like to
live in a city, to what kind of city we want to live in.
Having
evolved to meet the needs of industrialization, the city—and urban life, with
all its benefits and disadvantages—was felt by many sociologists to have been
imposed on people. The Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre believed that the
demands of capitalism had shaped modern urban society, but that ordinary people
could take control of their urban environment, what he called their “social
space.” Similarly (but from a different political standpoint), Jane Jacobs
advocated that people should resist the plans of urban developers and create
environments that encouraged the formation of communities within the city.
In
the late 20th century, several sociologists took up this idea of the loss of
community in our increasingly individualized Western society. A communitarian movement
emerged, led by US sociologist Amitai Etzioni, suggesting new ways to restore community
spirit in what had become an impersonal society. Robert D. Putnam also gave prominence
to the idea of community in his explanation of “social capital,” and the valuem
and benefits of social interaction.
Not
everyone agreed, however, that the answer to the social problems of urban life
was a return to traditional community values. Niklas Luhmann pointed out that
the problem today is one of communication between social systems that have
become increasingly fragmented and differentiated.
In the post-industrial age, with all its new methods of communication, new
strategies for social cohesion need to be found.
Post-industrial cities
The
nature of cities began to change in the late 20th century, as the manufacturing
industries moved out or disappeared. While some cities became ghost towns, others
became centers of the service industries. As working class areas were
gentrified, and industrial buildings became desirable postmodern living spaces,
the concept of modern metropolitan life became associated with prosperity
rather than gritty industrialization.
This
manifested itself not only in the transformation of urban living spaces, as
described by Sharon Zukin in the 1980s, but throughout the postmodern social order.
George Ritzer likened the efficiency and rationalization of the service
industries to the business model pioneered by fast-food chain McDonalds, and
Alan Bryman has noted how a US entertainment culture created by Disney has influenced
modern consumerism. Modern urban society, having been created by
industrialization, is now being shaped by the new demands of post-industrial
commerce.
STRANGERS ARE
NOT REALLY CONCEIVED AS INDIVIDUALS BUT AS STRANGERS OF A PARTICULAR TYPE GEORG
SIMMEL (1858–1918)
The Industrial Revolution was
accompanied in Europe and the US by urbanization from the 19th century onward.
For many people, this resulted in increased freedom as they experienced
liberation from the constraints of traditional social structures. But in tandem
with these developments came growing demands from capitalist employers for the
functional specialization of people and their work, which meant new
restrictions and curtailments of individual liberty.
German
sociologist Georg Simmel wanted to understand the struggle faced by the city
dweller in preserving autonomy and individuality in the face of these overwhelming
social forces. He discovered that the increase in human interaction that was brought
about by living and working in an urban environment profoundly affected
relationships between people. He set out his findings in The Metropolis andMental Life. Whereas in pre-modern society people would be intimately familiar
with those around them, in the modern urban environmentm individuals are
largely unknown to those who surround them. Simmel believed that the increase
in social activity and anonymity brought about a change in consciousness.
The
rapid tempo of life in a city was such that people needed a “protective organ”
to insulate them from the external and internal stimuli. According to Simmel,
the metropolitan “reacts with his head instead of his heart”; he erects a
rational barrier of cultivated indifference—a “blasé attitude.” The change in
consciousness also leads to people becoming reserved and aloof. This
estrangement from traditional and accepted norms of behavior is further undermined by the money
culture of cities, which reduces everything in the metropolis to a financial
exchange. Simmel says that the attitude of the metropolitan can be understood as
a social-survival technique to cope with the mental disturbance created by
immersion in city life— an approach that enables people to focus their energies
on those who matter to them. It also
results in them becoming more tolerant of difference and more sophisticated.
Space in the metropolis
Degrees
of proximity and distance among individuals and groups were central to Simmel’s
understanding of living in a metropolis, and ideas about social space
influenced one of his best-known concepts: the social role of “the stranger,”
which is set out in an essay in Sociology. In the past, he says,
strangers were encountered only rarely and fleetingly; but urbanite strangers
are not drifters—they are “potential wanderers.” Simmel says that the stranger
(such as a trader), or the stranger group (his example is “European Jews”), is
connected to the community spatially but not socially; he or she is
characterized by both “nearness and remoteness”—in the community but not
of it.
The
stranger was one of many social types described by Simmel, each becoming what
they are through their relations with others; an idea that has influenced many sociologists,
including Zygmunt Bauman. Erving Goffman’s concept of “civil inattention,”
whereby people minimize social interaction in public—by avoiding eye contact, for
instance—is also informed by one of Simmel’s insights: his notion of the “blasé
attitude
Georg Simmel
Born
in Berlin in 1858 to a prosperous Jewish family, Georg Simmel is one of the
lesser-known founders of sociology. He studied philosophy and history at the University
of Berlin and received his doctorate in 1881. Despite the popularity of his
work with the German intellectual elite, notably Ferdinand Tonnies and Max Weber,
he remained an outsider and only gained his professorship at Strasbourg in
1914.
He
developed what is known as formal sociology, which derives from his belief that
we can understand distinct human phenomena by concentrating not on the content
of interactions but on the forms that underlie behavior. But it is his study of
life in a metropolis that remains his most influential work, as it was the
precursor to the development of urban sociology by the so-called Chicago School
in the 1920s.
THE FREEDOM TO REMAKE
OUR CITIES AND OURSELVES HENRI LEFEBVRE (1901–1991)
The city need not be seen as a concrete
jungle— grimy, unpleasant, and threatening. For French sociologist and
philosopher Henri Lefebvre, who dedicated most of his life to the study of
urban society, it is an exciting and complex combination of power
relationships, diverse identities, and ways of being.
Writing
in the 1960s and 1970s, Lefebvre maintained that one of the most fascinating
aspects of the city is not simply the people in it, but the fact that it is an
environment that both reflects and creates society. Applying a Marxist perspective
to his analysis, Lefebvre also says that urban spaces are shaped by the state and
serve the interests of powerful corporations and capitalism. Parts of the city
mirror the class relations contained within it: the opulence of some areas
reveals the power and wealth of elites, while rundown inner-city areas and
ghettos
outside
the center indicate the displacement and marginalization of the poor, the
working class, and other excluded groups.
Public and private
Many
modern cities, for example, have become dominated by private spaces, such as
shopping malls and office complexes, built in the service of capitalism. The
loss of public space has severely restricted the arenas in which people can meet
on an equal footing with others, so eroding their personal freedoms and
stifling their means to satisfy their social and psychological needs. This can
lead to serious social problems, such as crime, depression, homelessness, social
exclusion, and poverty.
Considerable
power is wielded by those who own and control urban spaces—architects,
planners, “the merchant bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and politicians,” according
to Lefebvre. But he believes that decisions about the exact nature of the urban
environment—what takes place in it, how social space is built and used—should
be open to all. Ordinary people should participate in creating a space that
reflects their needs and interests—only by claiming this “right to the city”
can major social issues be addressed.
Lefebvre’s
vision is of cities that pulse with life and are vibrant expressions of human
freedom and creativity, where people can play, explore their creative and
artistic needs, and achieve some form of self-realization. City streets should,
he says, be designed to encourage this type of existence—they may be raw,
exciting, and untamed but precisely because of this they will remind people
that they are alive
Lefebvre’s
demand for the right to the city is not simply a call for a series of reforms
but for a wholesale transformation of social relations within the city, if not
wider society— it is, in essence, a proposal for a radical form of democracy,
whereby control is wrested from elites and turned over to the masses. This, he says,
is only achievable by groups and class factions “capable of revolutionary
initiative.”
Henri Lefebvre
Marxist
sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre was born in Hagetmau, France, in 1901.
He studied philosophy at the Sorbonne, Paris, graduating in 1920. He joined the
French Communist Party in 1928 and became one of the most prominent Marxist
intellectuals in France. He was, however, later expelled by the Communist Party
and became one of its fiercest critics. In 1961 he was appointed professor of
sociologyat the University of Strasbourg, before moving to Nanterre in 1965.
Lefebvre was a prolific writer on a wide range of subjects. His work challenged
the dominant capitalist authorities and as such was not
always well
received, but has gone on to influence several disciplines, including
geography, philosophy, sociology, political science, and architecture.
THERE
MUST BE EYES ON THE STREET
Jane Jacobs spent her working
life advancing adistinct vision of the city—inparticular
focusing on what makesa successful urban community.Her
ideas were formed from herobservations of urban life
in theneighborhood of West GreenwichVillage,
New York, where she livedfor more than 30 years.Jacobs
was opposed to thelarge-scale changes to city life thatwere
occurring in New York duringthe 1960s, led by city
planner andher archrival Howard Moses; theseincluded
slum-clearance projectsand the building of high-risedevelopments.
At the heart of hervision is the idea that urban lifeshould
be a vibrant and rich affair,where by people are able
to interactwith one another in dense andexciting
urban environments. Sheprefers chaos to order, walking todriving,
and diversity to uniformity.
For
Jacobs, urban communities are organic entities—complex, integrated ecosystems—that
should be left to grow and to change by themselves and not be subject to the
grand plans of so-called
experts and technocrats. The best judges of how a city should be—and how it
should
Jane Jacobs’ visionof
what a city street should be like is exemplified by this New York scene of
vibrant urban life, with residential apartments, streetlevel businesses, and
sidewalk bustle. evolve—are the local residents themselves. Jacobs argues that urban
communities are best placed to understand how their city functions, because
city life is created and sustained through their various interactions.
Ballet of the sidewalk
Jacobs
notes that the built form of a city is crucial to the life of an urban
community. Of prime importance are the sidewalks. The streets in which people
live should be a tight pattern of intersecting sidewalks, which allow people to
meet, bump into each other, converse, and get to know one another. She calls
this the “ballet of the sidewalk,” a complex but ultimately enriching set of encounters
that help individuals become acquainted with their neighbors and neighborhood.
Diversity
and mixed-use of space are also, for Jacobs, key elements of this urban form.
The commercial, business, and residential elements of a city should not be
separated out but instead be side by side, to allow for greater integration of
people. There should also be a diversity of old and new buildings, and people’s
interactions should determine how buildings get used and reused.
Finally,
urban communities flourish better in places where a critical mass of people
live, work, and interact. Such high-density— but not overcrowded—spaces are, she
feels, engines of creativity and vibrancy. They are also safe places to be,
because the higher density means that there are more “eyes on the street”:
shopkeepers and locals who know their area and provide a natural form of
surveillance.
Jane
Jacobs was a passionate writer and urbanist. She left Scranton, Pennsylvania
for New York in 1935, during the Great Depression. After seeing the Greenwich
Village area for the first time, she relocated there from Brooklyn—her interest
in urban communities had begun. In 1944 she married, and moved into a house on
Hudson Street.
It
was when Jacobs was working as a writer for the magazine Architectural Forum
that she first began to be critical of large top-down urban regeneration
schemes. Throughout her life she was an activist and campaigner for her
communitybased vision of the city. In 2007 the Rockefeller Foundation created
the Jane Jacobs Medal in her honor to celebrate urban visionaries whose actions
in New York City affirm her principles.
ONLY
COMMUNICATION CAN COMMUNICATE
Modernity’s defining feature, according
to German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, is advanced capitalist society’s
differentiation into separate social systems— nthe economic, educational, scientific,
legal, political, religious, and so on. Luhmann argues that the term “society”
refers to the system that encompasses all the other systems: society is, he
says, the system of systems.
Individuals,
Luhmann insists, are socially meaningless. Society’s base element is not the
human actor but “communication”—a term that he defines as the “synthesis of
information, utterance, and understanding” arising out of the activities and
interactions, verbal and nonverbal, within a system. Luhmann argues that just
as a plant reproduces its own cells in a circular, biological process of
self-production, so a social system is similarly self-sustaining and develops
out of an operation that possesses connectivity—emerging when “communication develops
from communication.” He likens communication to the structural equivalent of a
chemical.
Structural couplings
Luhmann
uses George Spencer- Brown’s ideas on the mathematical laws of form to help
define a system, arguing that something arises out of difference: a system is,
according to this theory, a “distinction” from its environment. And, says
Luhmann, a system’s environment is constituted by other systems. For example,
the environment of a family system includes other families, the political system,
the medical system, and so on. Crucially, each individual system can only make
sense of the events—the
activities and ways of communicating—peculiar to itself; it is relatively
indifferent to what takes place in the other systems (and the wider society).
So, for example, the economic system is functionally dedicated to its own interests
and is uninterested in moral issues, except where these might have an impact on
the profitability of economic activities and transactions—whereas moral concerns
are of great consequence in, say, the religious system.
Luhmann
identifies this lack of systems integration as one of the major problems
confrontingadvanced
capitalist societies. He identifies what he calls “structural couplings”—certain
forms and institutions that help to connect separated systems by translating the
communications produced by one system into terms that the other can understand.
Examplesinclude
a constitution, which couples the legal and political systems, and a
university, which couples the educational and, among others, economic systems.
“Structural
coupling” is a concept that helps to account for the relationship between
people (as conscious systems) and social systems (as communications).
Despite
its extreme complexity, Luhmann’s theory is used worldwide as an analytical
tool for social systems. His critics say that the theory passes academic scrutiny,
but operationally it fails to show how communication can take place without
human activity.
Niklas Luhmann
Niklas
Luhmann studied law at the University of Freiburg, Germany, from 1946 to 1949, before
becoming a civil servant in 1956. He spent 1960 to 1961 on sabbatical at
Harvard University, studying sociology and administrative science, where he was
taught by Talcott Parsons.
In
1966 Luhmann received his doctorate in sociology from the University of Munster
and in 1968 he became professor of sociology at the University of Bielefeld,
where he remained. Luhmann was the recipient of several honorary degrees, and in
1988 he was the winner of the prestigious Hegel Prize, awarded to prominent
thinkers by the city of Stuttgart. He was a prolific writer, with some 377
publications to his name.